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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the role of Inter- 
national Alert in promoting early warn- 
ing and early action in areas of 
international conflict. It begins by in- 
troducing the percepts of preventive di- 
plomacy as used by In terna tional Alert. 
A number of the organisation's objec- 
tives and activities are highlighted, 
showing the many ways in which the 
principles of conflict prevention and 
early warning are being developed in 
areas of potential violence and amongst 
a wider interdisciplinary audience. In 
conclusion, the main aims of Intema- 
tional Alert and our objective tocreatea 
global network with diferent sectors of 
the international community and to 
motivate the creation of a non-military 
early action mechanism to prevent the 
escalation of violent conflict are pre- 
sented. 
Cet article fait ttat du r6le jout par In- 
ternational Alert en matitre d'alerte 
prtventive et d'interven tion rapide 
dans des situations de conflits internes. 
Duns u n  premier temps, les principes de 
la diplomatie prhentive tels que mis en 
oeuvre par Interna tional Alert sont prt- 
sent&. U n  certain nombre d'objectifs et 
d'activitts de cette organisation sont 
ensuite mis en lumitre, illustrant les 
multiples facons don t les principes en 
mat ihe  de prtvention des conflits et 
d'alerte rapide peuvent i tre exploitts 
dans les situations de violence poten- 
tielle et la facon dont ces notions peu- 
vent etre discuttes au sein d'un public 
varit. En conclusion, les objectifi fon- 
damentaux d'lnternational Alert et le 
projet de crier u n  Rtseau global sont 
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prtsentis. Ce dernier, en rhnissant les 
divers secteurs de la communautt inter- 
nationale impliqub en matitre d'alerte 
prhen tive, vise h rkpondre h la ntcessi t t  
de crter un micanisme non-militaire 
des tint h prhenir l'tclatemen t et la pro- 
pagation des conflits violents. 
Introduction 
In 1985, a small group of scholars and 
human rights activists headed by Mar- 
tin Ennals, founder of Amnesty Inter- 
national, recognised that far too often 
conflicts within a country undermine 
efforts to protect human rights and 
promote sustainable development. 
Globally, there was evidence to sug- 
gest that inter-state wars were decreas- 
ing, but there were dangerous signs of 
intra-state conflicts increasing. Con- 
flicts rooted in identity, and unre- 
solved disputes that had been 
suppressed during the Cold War pe- 
riod, were emerging. The United Na- 
tions, whose prime function is to 
arbitrate and mediate in international 
disputes, was unlikely to intervene 
successfully in internal conflicts for 
which it had no mandate at all. So it 
was evident that the world had no 
structure or procedure through which 
these future wars could be prevented 
or resolved. International Alert was 
founded as an action-based non-gov- 
ernmental institution devoted to the 
study of internal conflicts, preventive 
diplomacy, and early warning systems 
whichcould help identlfy tensions and 
avert potential crises. 
Preventive Diplomacy 
Preventive diplomacy is a strategy to 
prevent the outbreak and escalation of 
violence in conflict. As developed by 
International Alert (IA) and others in 
the field of conflict prevention, preven- 
tive diplomacy arises out of the failure 
of traditional forms of state-based in- 
ternational diplomacy in dealing with 
internal conflicts. There are a number 
of key issues that can be raised here. 
First, though they are in many ways 
more complex than inter-state con- 
flicts, it is still possible to prevent inter- 
nal conflicts and to end violence. 
Prevention, however, requires care- 
fully developed strategic contingency 
plans that take account of military and 
non-military responses. Second, the 
lack of action and a failure of political 
will often allow conflicts to drag on. 
Inherent to political will is the question 
of selectivity. The international com- 
munity may mobilise its forces to in- 
tervene in Bosnia based on media 
attention, geographical proximity, or 
powerful lobby groups in the United 
States or Europe, but the lack of any 
such external pressure can isolate a 
country like Burundi and allow gov- 
ernments to use the principle of sover- 
eignty to justlfy their doing nothing. 
The recognition of a sovereign gov- 
ernment is a fundamental obstacle to 
intervention in internal conflicts. Ex- 
ternal governments and the UN can 
only become involved if they are offi- 
cially invited (UN Charter Art.II.vii). If 
there is no state consent to interven- 
tion, then there is less chance of access 
to all parties involved in the conflict. 
Conversely, intervention by one 
agency alone will not resolve the con- 
flict. Many of those who have tried to 
intervene have later been accused of 
abandoning their neutrality. The 
United Nations, for example, is often 
viewed with suspicion because of its 
strong governmental links. It is there- 
fore essential that governmental and 
non-governmental institutions try to 
cooperate and complement each oth- 
er's efforts and so as to mitigate biases 
as much as possible. 
This leads to a final consideration, 
which is the need for a structured ap- 
proach to prevention. The structured 
approach refers to a well coordinated 
- - -  -- 
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multi-track action mechanism, based 
on a division of labour that draws upon 
the comparative advantages and 
strengths of each agency. It recognises 
and addresses the different levels of 
conflict that need attention and has 
been described as "a web of intercon- 
nected parts (activities, individuals, 
institutions, communities) that oper- 
ate together, whether awkwardly or 
gracefully, for a common goal: A world 
at peace" (Diamond and McDonald 
1993). This perspective is substantially 
different from traditional military re- 
sponses, for it advocates a strategic 
coalition between inter-govehental, 
governmental and non-governmental 
agencies in conjunction with local 
peace constituencies and other rel- 
evant actors. 
Early Warning and Preventive 
Diplomacy 
By definition, preventive action is a 
response to warnings. Many of the 
early warning systems that already 
function efficiently are geared to iden- 
tlfying potential refugee flows, so that 
effective contingency plans can be acti- 
vated. In the field of conflict preven- 
tion, however, early warning is 
concerned with the ability to forecast 
potential conflicts. It is based on infor- 
mation gathering, informal and formal 
fact-finding, and, most importantly, a 
system of synthesising the data with 
political indicators to assess and ana- 
lyse the threat to peace and the action 
that needs to be taken (Boutros-Ghdi 
1992). Contingency planning for vic- 
tims is part of the system,but the prime 
focus is victim prevention. 
Early warning as a tool for conflict 
prevention requires regular monitor- 
ing and updating of a situation. A flow 
of information is essential to an early 
warning system, but the gathering of 
that information and subsequent 
analysis can raise problems. For a start, 
intelligence systems are geared to 
national security. It is also understand- 
able that within undemocratic re- 
gimes, people are suspicious of any 
attempts to develop new intelligence 
systems as these regimes often use 
their intelligence networks to identify 
signs of organised resistance. Conse- 
quently, it is essential that the primary 
aim of any system is the protection of 
vulnerable sectors of society against 
gross human rights violations, terror, 
genocide or politicide. The intention is 
to predict trends leading to an escala- 
tion in violence, long before the vio- 
lence becomes a reality. The objective 
is to initiate a proactive response to the 
conflict, using a network of regional 
and local NGOs and civic groups. 
The Role of International Alert 
The role of International Alert in ad- 
vancing early warning and early action 
is twofold. On the one hand IA, though 
not primarily an early warning agency 
itself, has pioneered and advocated a 
commitment to early warning and pre- 
ventive action. A number of published 
research papers discussing the concept 
of early warning, and surrounding is- 
sues, have been influential in the field 
of conflict prevention and amongst a 
wide inter-disciplinary audience.' 
More recent theoretical developments 
are discussed below. In addition, IA 
has acted as a catalyst to encourage 
inter-governmental bodies and other 
humanitarian and development insti- 
tutions to recognise the need for an 
early warning system. A number of 
these activities are outlined at a later 
stage in this paper. 
IA's conceptual approach to early 
warning is multi-faceted. First, we be- 
lieve that a single monolithic global 
early warning system is an unlikely 
development; rather, an effective sys- 
tem would be a function of a series of 
smaller networks. Furthermore, there 
is a danger of an 'information glut,' 
resulting in too many people being 
'warned' of too many things, but not 
enough people being able to take the 
necessary actions. This is predomi- 
nantly due to the fact that most organi- 
sations are unwilling to take action 
based on information gathered by oth- 
ers, so ownership of the information 
plays a key'role in promoting action. 
Ironically, despite the abundance of 
information, much needs to be im- 
proved in the area of data collection. 
Unfortunately, there is still a lack of 
coordination between information 
gatherers, who vary from being mem- 
bers of Non-governmental Organiza- 
tions (NGOs) and Inter-governmental 
Organizations (IGOs) through to 
church organisations, the media, and 
others. In addition, there is still a gap 
between quantitative data analysis 
and more qualitative, narrative-based 
reports. Quantitative analysis can be 
useful in monitoring and recognising 
the trends, particularly where figures 
of human rights violations are shown, 
but they have limited impact when 
political decisions need to be taken. 
This is a key problem in any discussion 
about the role of early action mecha- 
nisms, for it refers to the lack of co-or- 
dination between early warning and 
early action. It also raises other ques- 
tions regarding the nature of the action 
that needs to be taken and the time 
frame that needs to be in place at each 
stage of managing the conflict. 
Co-ordination, Complementarity, 
and Capacity-building 
At present, joint action is not, for the 
most part, being taken. This problem 
arises out of a number of practical con- 
siderations. First, many NGOs are lim- 
ited by their mandates. For example, 
the International Committee of the Red 
Cross has its own information gather- 
ing system, but cannot share this 
openly with other NGOs, nor can it act 
on data provided by others. Second, 
every organisation has its priorities. 
Amnesty International's focus on Ni- 
geria at a particular time, for example, 
may not bear relevance to Oxfam's 
programme, which may be simultane- 
ously focused on India. It is therefore 
necessary to develop means through 
which organisations are themselves 
involved in the gathering and 'own- 
ing' of information. A recent study 
concluded by the Netherlands Insti- 
tute of International Relations con- 
firms this. While examining the early 
warning and preventive actions of a 
number of inter-governmental organi- 
sations, the lack of effectiveness and 
cohesion in their operations was re- 
vealed. No well-developed early 
warning systems have yet been devel- 
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oped although many organisations 
such as the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions, (ASEAN), United Nations (UN), 
Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), and Organization 
of African Unity (OAU), are aware of 
the need for such a system (Siccama et 
al. 1996). 
There is still aneed for the coordina- 
tion of data collectors at the theoretical 
level. In other words, it is important to 
agree on a set of definitions for terms 
and concepts such as "conflict," "seri- 
ous dispute," "potential conflict" and 
others that are often inter-changed. 
Secondly, an agreed upon set of indi- 
cators must be developed and tested 
by data collectors. Thirdly, standard- 
ised reporting formats should be de- 
veloped to ease the exchange of 
information. Finally, IA is interested in 
the creation of an early waming clear- 
ing house which could collect and dis- 
seminate regular early warning data to 
a network of early action agencies. 
With access to information databases 
worldwide and a range of web sites on 
the Internet, the clearing house could 
synthesise the information gathered 
and offer a range of standardised re- 
ports on subjects such as countries at 
war, potential conflicts, minorities at 
risk, as well as thematic issues such as 
arms proliferation. The clearing house 
could also act as a referral system, with 
information on recognised experts and 
information brokers who could pro- 
vide more in-depth analysis. 
The early action network should be 
comprised of human rights organisa- 
tions, humanitarian agencies, devel- 
opment agencies, governments, 
regional and global inter-governmen- 
tal organisations such as the OAU, 
European Union (EU), and UN, the 
corporate sector, and the academic 
community amongst others. The aim 
would be to ensure that a diverse set of 
organisations have access to regular 
and reliable information about ongo- 
ing and potential conflicts, allowing 
them to determine a coordinated plan 
of early preventive action. 
Through coordination, there is also 
complementarity and a structured di- 
vision of labour. This has two main 
results. First, the early action network 
would be decentralised, so that for 
each region or country only a selected 
group would be involved in planning 
strategic action. This is efficient, as 
those actors with a particular interest 
or involvement in a region will be more 
willing to take early preventive action. 
Secondly, a cooperative division of la- 
bour would permit each agency to con- 
centrate on its areas of strength andnot 
be forced to deal with the complexity 
of a conflict in its entirety. For exam- 
ple, agencies with strong govemmen- 
tal ties could focus on advocacy, while 
others inform the media; those with 
local connections and facilities could 
concentrate on activating support in 
the conflict area. Furthermore, IA is 
currently encouraging the develop- 
ment of national coalitions of NGOs to 
work on specific regional or thematic 
issues. This gives NGOs a more uni- 
fied and influential voice, thus ena- 
bling them to take more effective 
action. 
The current lack of action also stems 
from another problem. It is often as- 
sumed that a good early warning sys- 
tem amongst the rich nations in the 
"North" will lead to preventive action 
by local actors in the "South." The 
warning of potential violence by exter- 
nal forces, however, will not quell the 
tension and conflict which exists in a 
country. It is therefore, necessary to 
develop early waming and preventive 
action mechanisms that draw on exter- 
nal and internal capabilities. Strength- 
ening grassroots and civic movements, 
assisting them in handling their own 
early waming systems and developing 
regional focal points, and working 
with organisations such as the OAU 
and regional African NGOs are intrin- 
sic to LA'S approach. 
As a means of developing and 
strengthening grassroots involvement 
in peace-building, IA organises train- 
ing seminars and workshops for local 
communities in conflict areas. The pro- 
grammes have both long- and short- 
term objectives. On the one hand, 
tr ing programmes aim to introduce 
th f concepts of multi-track diplomacy 
to those directly affected by violence. 
The purpose is to encourage locals to 
participate in peace-building initia- 
tives and to explore ways in which vio- 
lent conflict can be transformed 
peacefully. On the other hand, the 
long-term objectives of training and 
capacity building are intended to en- 
able local actors to take more decisive 
action against the surge of violence at 
an earlier stage. In other words, grass- 
roots capacity building is an early ac- 
tion to ensure that early warning of 
violent conflict will not be necessary in 
the future. 
U's Practical Approach 
In its efforts to encourage the develop- 
ment of a truly global network of early 
preventive action, IA has sponsored 
and participated in a number of re- 
gional conferences focusing on the is- 
sues surrounding early warning 
mechanisms. The aim of such confer- 
ences is to introduce the principles of 
prevention to a wider audience and, as 
well, to encourage broader participa- 
tion in the conceptual debate and prac- 
tical application of preventive 
diplomacy. 
To this effect, one aim has been to 
foster cooperation between NGOs and 
the UN. In January 1993, IA and the 
National Institute for Research Ad- 
vancement (NIRA) of Tokyo and the 
United Nations University (UNU) co- 
hosted an Expert's Round Table on 
'Preventive Diplomacy and the UN's 
Agenda for Peace' (held at UN head- 
quarters in New York). The purpose of 
the event was to share and evaluate 
experiences in preventive diplomacy, 
with particular reference to the UN. 
NGO and UN cooperation was also 
discussed. The following recommen- 
dations were made: 
1) that the UN Secretariat undertake 
an initiative to integrate the early 
warning work that was being du- 
plicated by the various UN agen- 
cies and to increase ties with 
relevant NGOs; 
2) that NGOs and the academic com- 
munity should participate in the 
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implementation of a computeri$ed 
early warning system in the Secre- 
tariat and that the monitoring of 
different regions be undertaken by 
UN staff and external experts; 
3) that a 24-hour early warning centre 
be created to monitor reports and 
disseminate information to rel- 
evant senior figures in the organi- 
sation paws  1993). 
The early warning centre is now in 
operation in New York. However, joint 
participation with outside experts is 
still very limited. 
Such cooperative efforts comp~ise 
part of the attempt to establish anNG0 
platform on early warning and preven- 
tive action. In May 1995, sixty repre- 
sentatives from key European agencies 
in the fields of development and hu- 
manitarian relief, and peace, along 
with human rights organisations dnd 
UN agencies met in Oslo to discuss 
ways in which conflict prevention 
could be placed on the agenda in Euro- 
pean policy. The development of an 
early warning platform which could 
gather and disseminate information 
regarding countries at risk was ambng 
the conference themes (Adrian-Paul 
1995). In particular, a steering commit- 
tee for the development of an NGO 
consortium was agreed upon. Links 
between 160 organisations are main- 
tained through the CPEN e-mail net- 
work. 
The main objective following from 
this conference was the creation and 
establishment of national platforms 
primarily in European countries to 
advocate and advance preventive di- 
plomacy in those countries, and to de- 
velop links with NGOs specialised in 
particular regions and local experts. 
The need for greater commitment and 
cooperation with development, hu- 
man rights and humanitarian agencies 
was also emphasised 
Another IA sponsored conference 
sought to explore an interdisciplinary 
approach to the issues of early warn- 
ing. In June 1995, the Steering Commit- 
tee of the Conflict Early Warning 
Systems (CEWS) Research Programme 
met at IA's headquarters in London 
(CEWS is part of the Internatiopal 
Social Science Council). The aim was to 
provide a positive, interdisciplinary, 
social scientific response to Dr. Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace. The 
strategy is to seekways in whichNGOs 
and the UN can cooperate and comple- 
ment each other's activities, particu- 
larly in the development of early 
warning systems and preventive ac- 
tion. The Committee has two objec- 
tives. The first is to create and 
disseminate (via the Internet) a set of 
comparative, interdisciplinary case 
studies of conflict prevention suc- 
cesses and failures. The results will be 
published in abook with contributions 
from members of the Steering Group. 
Secondly, they plan to improve and 
extend accessibility to a database on 
conflict prevention, including analy- 
ses of historical cases, and conceptual 
developments (Alker et al. 1995). 
These efforts all continue the proc- 
ess of developing models and address- 
ing policy issues. In 1993, IA and the 
Centre for International Development 
(CIDCM) in Maryland jointly spon- 
sored a workshop on the Early Warn- 
ing of Communal Conflicts and 
Humanitarian Crises, bringing to- 
gether primary and secondary data 
holders from a variety of disciplines. 
The objectives of the workshop were to 
discuss the issues surrounding the co- 
ordination of data collection and pos- 
sible models for early warnhig 
systems. Problems of policy and lack 
of political will on the part of Western 
powers, and the need forbuildingpub- 
lic awareness regarding preventive 
action and planning specific responses 
were also discussed. Six major recom- 
mendations arose from the workshop 
seminars: 
1) Electronic networks should be de- 
veloped for the sharing of early 
warning information; 
2) Key variables must be identified in 
the way information is gathered 
and shared; 
3) Researchers should establish and 
strengthen their networks regard- 
ing the collecting and coding of rel- 
evant information; 
4) A 'common language' for classifi- 
cation of data must be developed; 
5) The network between NGOs, re- 
searchers and activists should be 
broadened to include groups from 
within the regions of conflict; 
6) A simulation meeting focused on 
one country or region should be 
held, so that NGO representatives 
and regional experts could engage 
in the early warning process. 
Capacity-building in Africa, and 
increased communication among Af- 
rica-based NGOs, has been of particu- 
lar concern. In September 1994, IA and 
the Ad Hoc Committee for Peace and 
Development of Ethiopia sponsored a 
joint conference on The Challenge for 
Peacemaking in Africa: Conflict Preven- 
tion and Conflict Resolution. Over 250 
participants made up of NGO repre- 
sentatives, scholars, women's groups, 
grassroots organisations, and local and 
international donors attended. This 
was the first conference of its kind in 
Africa, and the cross-sectored discus- 
sions resulted in a series of recommen- 
dations. Especially with regard to early 
warning and conflict prevention, the 
following recommendations were 
made. 
1) An information database should be 
created as an analytical tool for re- 
searchers and practitioners, with a 
strong early warning component; 
2) Multi-sectored alliances need to be 
developed between governments, 
NGOs, the media and research in- 
stitutions; 
3) Focal points should be identified at 
the sub-regional level and national 
level and alliances formed; 
4) National advocacy and early warn- 
ing platforms should be formed, 
aimed at decision makers; 
5) The early warning system should 
ensure that decision makers are 
held accountable; 
6) An informal network within the 
NGO community should be estab- 
lished to build trust (International 
Alert 1994a). 
Following from the 1994 conference, a 
Focal Points workshop was arranged 
by IA and the Inter-Africa Group 
bringing together participants from 
throughout the African continent. The 
purpose of the workshop was to facili- 
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tate the establishment of an early 
warning mechanism among Africa- 
based NGOs and to increase the capac- 
ity of 1ocalNGOs to take more decisive 
and effective action. Cooperation and 
collaboration between the NGO and 
inter-governmental sectors was also 
explored (International Alert 1994b). 
Several recommendations were made: 
1) Anew bi-monthly publication (and 
on-line web page), Early Warning 
News, produced by Inter-press 
Service Africa would be used as an 
indicator for action. Data would be 
gathered from various constituen- 
cies (media, church, legal and 
human rights organisations, aca- 
demics, NGOs, and other civic 
groups) invited to participate in a 
forum for debate; 
2) The UN Economic Commission for 
Africa and -Inter-Africa Group 
agreed to establish a database of 
local, regional, and international 
actors in the region; 
3) The Council for the Development 
of Socid Science Research in Africa 
(CODESRIA) and the Centre for 
Conflict Resolution (CCR) agreed 
to build a conflict specific core re- 
search group, allowing scholars to 
exchange data and making the CCR 
resource Centre available for wider 
use; 
4) IA agreed to hold an annual meet- 
ing between participants to discuss 
on-going initiatives and new devel- 
opments; 
5) The group plans to establish closer 
ties with the OAU and other re- 
gional inter-governmental fora, 
through regular meetings of a con- 
sultative committee; 
6) The' participation of women was 
encouraged. In particular women's 
roles in information dissemination 
should be developed. 
Sub-regional focal points meetings 
will take place in Tunisia, West, Cen- 
tral, Eastern and Southern Africa in 
November 1996. The objectives will be 
to strengthen and develop platforms 
for early warning and early action. 
In addition to these links to early 
warning projects in Africa, IA has been 
working with groups in the former 
Soviet Union. IA has had close links 
with the network created by the Insti- 
tute of Ethnology and Anthropology 
(IEA) of the Russian Academy of Sci- 
ence and the Conflict Management 
Group (CMG) located in the United 
States, since 1992. In 1995, IA under- 
took a feasibility study on their behalf 
for an early warning network in the 
former Soviet Union. The IEA/CMG 
network now has over forty members 
throughout the Russian Federation 
and CIS countries. In September 1996, 
network members will meet at IA 
headquarters in London to share expe- 
riences of early warning and discuss 
conflict situations in the region. 
Developing Common Standards 
and a Menu of Options 
IA's current and future work in early 
warning will continue to centre on the 
development of regional focal points 
and cooperation with local NGO 
groups. We are also involved in devel- 
oping standards for reporting, assess- 
ing, and responding to early warning. 
Working closely with PIOOM (Dutch 
abbreviation for Interdisciplinary Re- 
search Program on Root Causes of 
Human Rights Violations) in the 
Netherlands, the Centre for Documen- 
tation and Research at the UNHCR, 
Human Rights Information and Docu- 
mentation Systems International 
(HURIDOCS) in Geneva and the Cen- 
tre for International Development and 
Conflict Management in Maryland, 
our aim is to create a standard format 
for monitoring, developing, and test- 
ing sets of indicators, and plan how 
information can be pooled or dissemi- 
nated to people who can respond. A 
menu of options for action using the 
different tools and approaches of con- 
flict prevention will also be developed 
and applied on a case by case basis to 
provide recommendations for action 
by internal and external parties. 
In addition to being a major partici- 
pant in the above gatherings, IA is also 
very active in the field of advocacy and 
lobbying of parliamentary groups and 
inter-governmental organisations 
such as the EU, OAU, and OSCE. In the 
EU especially, IA has been directly in- 
vo ed in promoting the concept of 
pr f d i v e  diplomacy and a need for 
early warning, through the Michel 
Rocard initiative for the establishment 
of a European Analysis Centre for Ac- 
tive Crisis Prevention. It has also been 
active in the formation of the Bernard 
Kouchner's Parliamentary Inter- 
group on Crisis Prevention which 
meets monthly. In parallel to the 
Racard Initiative, IAis jointly working 
with Saferworld in lobbying for con- 
flict prevention measures to be intro- 
duced to the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) of the Maas- 
tricht Treaty which is currently being 
revised and reassessed (IGC began in 
Mrarch 1996). In May 1996, IA co- 
hosted a conference on Conflicts in 
Africa with the North-South Centre 
aad Synergies Africa (Adrian-Paul 
and Win 1996). The main objectives 
were to influence the CFSP by devel- 
oping a policy framework for conflict 
prevention in Africa within the EU, 
and to develop a plan for future coop- 
eration. IA's advocacy programme is 
part of a wider objective to make pre- 
ventive diplomacy a strategic goal for 
the 21st century. 
The prevention and resolution of 
conflicts, the establishment of early 
warning networks and structured ac- 
tion programs cannot be achieved sin- 
de-handedly. It is beyond the capacity 
of any single organisation or indeed 
any single sector to realize such goals. 
This does not imply that prevention 
itself is impossible; rather, that to suc- 
ceed in diffusing a potential war, coor- 
dinated efforts must be made. 
Notes 
1. For a comprehensive list of such papers, 
please contact International Alert at the 
address listed'in the "Selected Efforts on 
Early Warning" elsewhere in this issue. 
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